At present, the demand for organs far outstrips the supply. In 2007, only 21,489 deceased donors were reported to the Global Database on Donation and Transplantation. (Matesanz 2009) In United States, as of the end of February 2010, 105,966 patients were on waiting lists for transplantation. (OPTN 2010) . In the United Kingdom, an estimated 9,000 patients need an organ transplant at any given time but only 3500 transplantations were carried out in 2008. In July 2009, the UK announced plans to ban private patients from paying for organ transplants in order to address concerns about fairness of the allocation system-and to allay complaints that patients from abroad were coming to the UK to receive transplants as private pay patients.
(Weaver 2009) In the European Union, according to a 2007 Communication from the European
Commission, there were 40,000 people on the waiting list for transplants; an estimated 10 people in the EU die every day waiting for an organ. (Shimazono 2007) Although it is estimated that 1.5 million Chinese patients need organ transplants, only approximately 10,000 operations take place annually because of the severe shortage of organ donors. (Paddock 2009 ) With the aging of populations worldwide, increased affluence, and growth in burdens of disease such as diabetes, demand for transplantation is increasing exponentially. (Jafar 2009) Transplantation of organs is thus a life-prolonging, last resort therapy for many; but there is a grave mismatch between supply and demand. Donation rates vary widely; for example, within the EU, Spain has a donation rate of 34.6/million and Romania a donation rate of 0.5/million. (Europa 2008) Many countries are only now instituting regularized systems for organ donation and allocation. Proposals to increase the supply of organs include adoption elsewhere of the presumption of consent in effect in Spain. They also include strategies of paired donation, in which patients with willing donors who are not matches for them can link up with other likewise unmatched pairs to trade for matches, and the use of biobanks to identify possible matches for patients. (Forsberg, Eriksson, and Hansson 2010) Proposals to allow sale of organs (Hippen, Ross & Sade, 2009; Satel 2008 ) are more controversial for many reasons, including increased risks of trafficking. (Rothman & Rothman, 2006) Under these circumstances, it is understandable that patients engage in strategies to obtain organs from outside of their home jurisdictions, including both medical tourism and the purchase of organs.
So-called "organ transplant tourism" occurs when potential organ recipients cross national borders to undergo organ transplantation. Medical tourism generally occurs for many reasons, including the comparative quality of care at home and abroad, unavailability or unacceptable waiting times for care at home, and relative costs of care. Growing rates of medical tourism raise concerns about justice to patients in both home jurisdictions and jurisdictions in which the care is provided, about the ability of home jurisdictions to maintain cost and quality control over the care patients receive, and about the adequacy of informed consent across borders. Bioethicists in countries such as India voice concerns about internal brain drains and diversion of resources. (Gupta 2008 (Gupta 2008) , and the global availability of medical services is widely advertised across the web.
Tourism for the purposes of organ transplantation raises particular concerns, however, especially when the organ donor does not come from the patient's home country. Patients seeking transplants abroad may encounter poorer quality of care and greater risks of infection including Hepatitis B, HIV, Aspergillus, and fungal sepsis. Such very sick patients require extensive care when they return home, in addition to the lifelong anti-rejection regime faced by all transplant recipients, and may encounter obstacles to the availability of this care. (Bramstedt and Xu 2007) Transplant physicians in the United States reportedly express greater moral doubts about continuing to treat patients who received their organs abroad, especially because of ethical concerns about procurement practices (Biggins et al. 2009 ) but also because of the possibility that antibiotic resistant infections acquired abroad may pose risks to other patients (Bramstedt and Xu 2007) . Uninsured patients who can afford transplantation abroad may be unable to finance their requirements for ongoing care when they return home. (Bramstedt and Xu 2007) Richer patients from abroad may divert organs from less-well-off domestic patients and utilize hospital resources that might otherwise have been available domestically. (Gupta 2008) Although some transplant tourism programs transport recipient-donor pairs identified in their country of origin, others rely on overseas organ supplies. (Bramstedt and Xu 2007) By far the greatest ethical concern about transplant tourism is the victims of organ procurement itself. Living donors may be the source of kidneys, lungs, corneas, and liver lobes. And the demand from wealthier patients is unrelenting, especially in countries such as Japan or Israel where there may continue to be reluctance to donate for cultural reasons. In Japan, for example, "brain death" is not recognized (WHO 2006) , so deceased donor supplies are limited.
In Israel, some orthodox Jews oppose organ donation; Israel has recently adopted a controversial preference in organ allocation to people with donor cards that will be implemented in 2011. These efforts-of the WHO, the United Nations, and international societies-lack direct enforcement mechanisms. They remain hortatory at best. As we shall now see, they have been met with limited implementation success at both domestic and international levels.
Domestic enforcement: limited implementation of bans on organ trafficking
Within Europe, legal instruments such as the European Charter on Fundamental Rights Thus international efforts at prevention are prescriptive but lack an enforcement regime.
Individual countries remain ambivalent about enforcement; this is not surprising, given the incentives supporting trafficking that we have documented. Moreover, trafficking is difficult to control within any single jurisdiction. Trafficking is truly a transboundary activity, potentially involving multiple jurisdictions: the location of organ procurement, the location of the recipient, the place where actual transplantation occurs, and the location of any organ broker. (Shimazono 2007) To date, despite international appeals, its punishment has remained largely stateless. It seems reasonable, therefore, to entertain the possibility of subjecting the international trade in organs to an international criminal law regime.
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and organ trafficking
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is limited at present to three crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. While the conditions for any of these three Tobago and Belize, argue that drug trafficking is a crime that "is transboundary in character" but that places "inordinate burden on the judicial and law enforcement" of many states. (ICC 2009a) Although organ trafficking as we have argued would appear strikingly similar, neither it nor other forms of human trafficking were included in the proposal.
Organ trafficking and international criminal law
Organ trafficking thus illustrates a failure of both international and domestic criminal law. This is thus an area that might be regarded as one of imperfect or "partial compliance" Consider, finally, how the legitimacy of a regime of international criminal law might be affected by the development of a system to address transboundary offenses such as organ trafficking. Gaining legitimacy has been a persistent difficulty for the ICC, perhaps because of the quite limited range of offenses and offenders that it addresses. Development of an international enforcement regime that deals with more ubiquitous harms in a manner that enhances efficacy and salience might help to address this legitimacy problem. Salience and efficacy, in short, can help to bolster needed legitimacy.
To be sure, progress towards justice could be achieved in other ways as well. At the national level or even international level, problems in the supply of organs might be addressed, although scarcity appears ineluctable at present. Appropriate regulatory regimes might be established to effectively discourage or restrict citizens from leaving their own countries in search of transplantable organ elsewhere. But, as we have seen above, in the states that "export" individuals in search of organs there is a reluctance to condemn individuals or to criminalize what they have done even if it contributes to a practice that inflicts great harm.
To be sure, whether it is practical to expect the development of such a global enforcement regime remains unclear. The pressures on domestic legal regimes may simply be too great. What is clear, however, is that there is general agreement that organ trafficking is a grave international problem that remains under-addressed by both the exhortations of international organizations such as the WHO and by the domestic laws of individual states. It is truly a transboundary offense and, as such, currently represents a missed opportunity for the development of support for international criminal law.
